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Chapter 10 
Unions, Markets, and 
Democracy in Latin America 
by Maria Lorena Cook 
Introduction 
In the 1990s scholars of Latin America moved from a concern with democratization 
to a focus on the implementation of market economic reforms. With this shift, the 
appreciation of labor unions' value to society was lost. Whereas earlier analyses of 
democratic transitions recognized organized labor's important role in bringing an end 
to dictatorships, later studies of market reform viewed labor organizations as either 
obstacles to be overcome, "losers" to be compensated, or simply irrelevant.' 
Perhaps more important than scholarship's neglect of labor unions is the neglect 
that is reflected in policies toward labor in the region. Economic and labor market 
policies as well as labor law reforms have left workers and labor organizations more 
vulnerable without creating adequate protections, bolstering labor rights, or democ-
ratizing industrial relations systems. I argue that these policies have had significant 
costs that in turn affect two important contemporary debates: (1) how to strengthen 
labor rights in the global economy; and (2) how to consolidate and deepen democ-
racy in Latin America. 
Labor, Democracy, and Rights in Latin America 
In Latin America labor movements were at the forefront of struggles to expand citi-
zens' rights. Scholars have noted the central role of the Latin American working 
class in shaping regime dynamics and in advocating for democracy, in contrast to 
the similar role played by the middle class in Europe.2 Through these struggles, la-
bor movements expanded workers' rights, forged political alliances, and eventually 
shaped national politics in fundamental ways. The incorporation of labor into poli-
tics in the early to mid-twentieth century set a pattern of political involvement and 
partisan alliance in Latin America that continues to this day. 
The Future of Labor Unions 
Labor's support for democracy was evident at several points in the region's history. 
Workers and union leaders suffered at the hands of repressive regimes, and unions 
spearheaded societal protests against dictatorships, most recently in the 1980s in the 
Southern Cone (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Chile). In this way, labor organiza-
rions in Larin America typically expressed the broader interests of society and saw 
political engagement as essential to ptotecting these interests. 
Labor legislation often reflected this political relationship between labor and the 
state. At the beginning of the twentieth century, labor legislation in Latin America 
was aimed at protecting individual workers from employer abuse and arbitrariness. 
The idea was that workers were entitled to "job security." Hence, laws ser relatively 
high dismissal costs in the form of severance formulas linked to length of employ-
ment. The gap between law and reality is well known in Latin America and in most 
developing countries. Nonetheless, the intent of the legislation reflecrs a particular 
political and economic period in which expanded industrialization led to a more in-
clusive approach toward workers and unions. Political coalitions consisting of nation-
al industrialists and unions led by populist politicians also emerged in this period. 
Examples include Peron in Argentina, Vargas in Brazil, and Cardenas in Mexico. 
Nonetheless, the state's protective attitude toward workers reflected a paternalistic 
rather than a democratic and rights-based state. This was especially evident in the 
state's tteatment of trade unions. As Bronstein has indicated, collective rights have al-
ways been somewhat limited in Latin America.3 Collective rights legislation has been 
characterized by a high degree of state intervention in an effort to control the polirical 
radicalism and militancy of workers' organizations. In those countries where workers' 
organizations were weak in the early part of the century, these laws tended to be more 
intrusive. Where unions were already stronger and especially where they formed part 
of the populist coalition, as in Argentina and Mexico, laws reflected a combination 
of opportunities for state intervention and considerable privileges and advantages for 
unions. However, in no country can we say that a liberal rights regime—with full 
union autonomy, free collecrive bargaining, and rhe full right to strike—took shape. 
No t until the post-authoritarian period of the late twentieth century do expanded 
rights for workers begin to appear in counrries undergoing democratic transition. 
Again, where unions are relatively strong and have played an active role in the transi-
tion, they also tend to have a greater capaciry to mobilize for stronger bargaining, or-
ganizing, and strike rights. Such was the case in Argentina, where all of the tights and 
privileges removed during rhe period of military rule were restored, and Brazil, where 
the 1988 constitution established a liberal labor rights regime, at least on paper. 
In other cases, however, expanded union rights were granted earlier, during leftist 
governments that were ulrimately overrhrown by coups or overtaken by conservarive 
governments that dismanded the prior regimes. This was the case in Peru, where la-
bor laws were very favorable toward unions undet the left-wing military government 
in the 1970s; and also in Chile, where the Allende government's pro-labor reforms 
succumbed ro the Pinochet dictatorship's restrictive Labor Plan. 
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After the repressive dictatorships of the 1960s and 1970s, the democratic transi-
tions in the 1980s greatly expanded labor's sphere of action. These periods of demo-
cratic transition and consolidation involved rebuilding institutions, securing political 
stability, and restoring civil and political rights to citizens. Democratic governments 
found themselves under pressure to restore collective labor rights and protective em-
ployment laws that were removed during anti-labor military regimes, or else to extend 
rights and protections not present before. Reforms undertaken during democratic 
transition periods tended to reinforce or extend protections to individual workers 
and to restore or bolster collective rights, such as the right to strike, to organize, and 
to bargain collectively.6 (This expansion of legal tabor rights during democratic tran-
sitions occurred to varying degrees in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay, 
Guatemala, and El Salvador.) 
Even where democratic governments might have resisted implementing la-
bor-friendly reforms, they were often confronted by the relative social and po-
litical strength of organized labor.7 In general, trade unions also enjoyed greater 
legitimacy in this period due to their persecution under the military and their 
role in the transitions to democracy.8 Governments faced a societal consensus 
that saw favorable policy reforms as labor's d u e . Th i s consensus often had 
a stronger bearing on labor reform outcomes than strict partisan concerns 
about labor const i tuencies . 
The premium placed on political stability and accommodation during democratic 
transition produced a generally favorable political context for labor, even when the 
economy was unfavorable. Strike activity increased throughout the region during 
idemocratic transitions.9 Labor protest against structural adjustment policies was also 
high. Labor was able to engage in a traditional sectoral strategy—strike activity—but 
it was also able to operate in a number of arenas made available by the return of de-
mocracy. This included political party activity, working through congressional allies 
to defend its interests, participating in demonstrations with other sectors of civil so-
ciety, engaging in tripartite accords or direct negotiations with the state, and in some 
cases, collective bargaining at the level of the firm or economic sector. In this context, 
organized labor was not only better able to advocate for labor rights, but it was also 
free to protest such policies as stabilization measures that it would later find more 
difficult to resist. Such relative freedoms secured labor's commitment to democracy, 
even if labor movements vigorously protested against their democratic governments 
for the shortcomings of the economy and other failures.10 
arket Reform and Unions 
T h e late 1980s and 1990s usheted in a period of market economic reform in the 
region. The policies associated with this reform wave, known generally as the "Wash-
ington Consensus," involved trade liberalization, privatization, deregulation, fiscal 
discipline, state retrenchment, and related market-oriented changes in social policies 
and institutions, such as tax reform.11 These reforms had a dramatic impact on the 
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economic fortunes of workers. They also affected the political climate for unions in 
ways that contrasted sharply with the democratic transition period. 
Most economic reforms had the effect of generating higher levels of unemploy-
ment.12 Trade liberalization and privatization both produced layoffs, the first in 
noncompetitive sectors and the second associated with the restructuring that often 
accompanied the sale of state enterprises to private hands. Economic growth also re-
mained disappointing in the 1990s after a devastating economic performance during 
the 1980s debt crisis. Modest economic recovery in the mid-1990s was followed by 
declines in most of the region, with the corresponding implications for employment. 
In some countries, such as Mexico, the economy simply could not grow fast enough 
to absorb new labor market entrants.13 In others, like Brazil, unemployment increased 
despite economic growth in the mid-1990s. l 4The impact of emerging-market finan-
cial crises on the region during the mid-to-late 1990s was also substantial (Mexico, 
Asia, Russia, Brazil). Argentina's economy saw its worst depression ever at the be-
ginning of the new century and its future remains uncertain. In short, after initial 
optimistic predictions of growth produced by structural reforms in the early 1990s, 
the region remains far from economically stable. 
Along with higher levels of unemployment, employment itself generally became 
more precarious. The number of people working In the informal sector—always rela-
tively high in the region—increased in many countries in the 1990s.15 Levels of social 
protection also fell as the percentage of workers who contributed to social security 
declined. Unemployment insurance is not available in many countries, and where it 
exists, it is very limited. Inequality also increased in this decade, and indeed was cited 
as one of the most disturbing developments of the reform movement of the 1990s. 
On average, real minimum wage levels remained 50 percent lower in 2001 than they 
were in 1980.16 Poverty also increased in the region, most notably in ravaged coun-
tries like Argentina, which had been known for a strong middle class, and in war-torn 
Colombia. By virtually every indicator conditions were worse by the end of the 1990s 
than they were at the beginning of the decade. 
These structural economic changes and their labor market effects weakened labor 
organizations by reducing their membership,17 increasing labor force segmentation, 
and creating an adverse environment for strikes. The strengthening of business ac-
tors, who were often favored by trade liberalization, privatization, and flexible labor 
market policies, diminished unions' relative power in society. 
The political context was also unfavorable. Market rationality and efficiency rather 
than rights and democracy became the watchwords of government. Unions were por-
trayed as privileged special interests that sought only to protect their access to sources 
of corruption and wealth for union leaders or as market-distorting institutions that 
pushed up wages at the expense of the vast majority excluded from the formal labor 
market. This portrayal of unions in turn legitimized policies and legal reforms that 
sought to remove or reduce unions' sources of power. 
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Labor Reform: The Neoliberal Agenda 
In general, where re-democratization occurred it also ushered in a return to or an 
expansion of collective labor rights. However, these still fell short of a fully liberal 
rights regime, and state intervention and control often remained part of the system. 
In Mexico, where the majority of the labor movement strongly defended the status 
quo, this was especially true, even under the opposition government of Vicente Fox. 
In most cases, however, the labor market reforms that accompanied or followed eco-
nomic reforms aimed to further constrain labor unions and collective rights. These 
market-era reforms represented a shift in direction away from individual and collec-
tive workers' rights toward cost-cutting and employer flexibility. It was in part this 
change in direction that generated the virulent reactions and counterattacks on the 
part of the strongest labor movements in the region. Also notable was the fact that 
this shift away from rights was taking place in countries that were already democratic; 
most were in their second or third rounds of democratic government. Yet creating a 
more democratic labor law regime or industrial relations system was rarely cited as a 
goal of these governments. 
Indeed, labor may be at a special disadvantage in democracies where economic 
transitions preceded democratic transitions. In these cases labor may move into the 
democratic transition weakened by the structural economic changes of neoliberal 
reform as well as by legal-institutional changes imposed during dictatorship, as in the 
Chilean case. In addition, the core task of democratic governments is complicated 
by a commitment to preserve economic reforms implemented earlier, which often 
conflicts with the expansion of labor rights. While democratization may generate a 
public debate about expanded labor rights, as in contemporary Mexico, and even lead 
to movement in this direction, as in Chile, the constraints on a fuller expansion of 
labor rights and on unions' ability to mobilize for these tends to be greater. 
Labor reform has been seen as a logical next step to the market-oriented reforms 
implemented throughout the region.18 In the current economy, firms and employ-
ers are obliged to adapt their production and workforce to the fluctuating demands 
and competitive pressures of the market. In this context, laws dating from early in 
the last century that protect job stability—and hence constrain employers and firms' 
adaptability—are seen as anachronistic. This has meant that the focus of reform in 
recent years has centered on what has been called "flexibility": lowering employer 
costs and increasing employers' ability to manage their workforce and adjust rapidly 
to fluctuating conditions. 
Advocates of flexible labor reform insist that revision of national labor codes is 
essential to address such problems as unemployment, segmented labor markets, in-
equality, poverty, and global competitiveness. According to these advocates—which 
include international financial institutions such as the Inter-American Development 
Bank and International Monetary Fund—"rigid" labor legislation, especially obsta-
cles to dismissals, constrains job creation, encourages capital substitution for labor, 
and promotes the informal sector. Such employment constraints, together with cen-
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tralized forms of collective bargaining and monopoly union representation, drive up 
wages and other labor costs associated with formal sector workers past their "market 
price." This distorts the labor market and encourages its segmentation into the "privi-
leged" few who enjoy labor protection legislation and the majority, or at least large 
minority, who lack protections and higher wages. Since many of those excluded from 
formal sector work are women, young people, and the poorest workers, these distor-
tional effects on the labor market contribute to widening inequality among different 
sectors of the population.19 
This analysis of the effects of Latin American countries' labor law "rigidity" has 
led to a variety of policy prescriptions and recommendations. In order to address 
restrictions on forms of hiring and dismissals, suggested changes include limiting sev-
erance payments in dismissals or converting these to deferred-compensation plans; 
permitting part-time and temporary employment contracts; lowering the amounts 
employers must pay in levies and contributions, sometimes requiring changes in the 
way social security is funded and administered; allowing employers to replace striking 
workers; revising the definition of "just dismissal" to include economic distress of the 
firm; pension reform; revising minimum wage regulations; and instituting some form 
of unemployment insurance.20 
The recommended policies that are most likely to adversely affect unions include 
decentralizing collective bargaining to the firm or enterprise level; forbidding the 
closed shop and encouraging the "right-to-work" (the prohibition of laws or contract 
clauses requiring workers to be members of a union, join the union, or pay union 
dues as a condition of employment); giving individual employment contracts priority 
over collective agreements; restricting the scope of "bargainable" subjects in collective 
negotiations; expanding categories of employees that are excluded from unionization 
(such as "confidential" and supervisory personnel); permitting striker replacements; 
prohibiting solidarity strikes and boycotts; and expanding the definition of "essential 
services" with restrictions on strike and bargaining rights.21 
In this formulation of labot flexibility, cost reduction is favored over labor rights.22 
To the extent that workers' rights enter into the equation, they are cast in individual 
rather than collective terms. Workers have a right to employment, which is obtained 
both by enforcing the law and, ironically, by easing constraints on employers to dis-
miss. Workers also have a right to protection from the abusive practices of unions, 
which are depicted as unrepresentative and undemocratic institutions.23 (This view 
of unions provides the justification for policies advocating "right-to-work" and free 
association as an individual choice.) Because it ignores the importance of conflict in 
industrial relations and the power imbalance between workers and employers, and 
because it favors individual over collective rights, this neoliberal view is one of rights 
without the power to defend them. Neither strong unions nor a strong state are seen 
as necessary to provide counterweights to capital. 
This individualistic view of rights also informs flexibility advocates' view of unions. 
Union gains are posited in zero-sum terms, with the costs borne by informally employed 
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or unemployed workers, women, and youth, rather than as potential vehicles for redistri-
bution with an overall positive effect on wages, working conditions, and labor standards. 
Despite the evidence that union density (and hence an important component of union 
strength) has declined dramatically in the region, unions are still seen as "unnaturally" 
strong by those advocating flexible labor market and wage policies. 
Labor Law and Labor Rights 
Although the flexibility agenda has defined much of the debate surrounding labor 
reform in the region, it has not determined all the labor law changes that have oc-
curred. This section looks at how actual reforms implemented in the region have 
affected both individual and collective labor rights through a variety of mechanisms. 
I also move beyond the focus on legal changes, however, to suggest that the lack of 
reforms in some areas has also had a negative impact on labor rights. 
Most changes in labor law have affected individual employees. Here, however, 
the picture is mixed. In the early part of the reform period many labor law chang-
es extended protections, especially in the areas of maternity and paternity leave 
and other protections for women workers. However, reforms also lowered exist-
ing protections for workers in an effort to make hiring and firing more flexible 
and less expensive for employers. Among reforms affecting individual workers 
were longer probat ionary periods in employment, lower severance pay formulas, 
flexible work schedule and compensation arrangements, and special exemptions 
from labor regulation for small- and medium-sized enterprises, which employ the 
majority of workers in many countries. 
Another common reform implemented throughout the region was the expansion 
of temporary work contracts, with lower dismissal costs and reduced payroll taxes. 
Fixed-term contracts were adopted in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, Chile, and 
Argentina (although in Argentina these were latet rescinded in a 1998 law). In some 
countries the number of workers subject to fixed-term employment contracts ex-
panded tremendously. In other cases, such as Brazil, the number of fixed-term con-
tracts was limited and subject to collective bargaining, which explained their more 
limited use.24 
Both legal reforms and market conditions have served to increase labor market 
flexibility, even though the specific results have not always been intentional or the 
most efficacious from the point of view of society's demands for skill enhancement 
and training. The high percentage of workers laboring in the informal sector attests 
to this. Yet, in few cases has increased flexibility been accompanied by enhanced 
social protection, such as adequate unemployment insurance or training and em-
ployment information programs. The result is that workers find themselves forced 
to move within increasingly unstable labor markets without access to adequate social 
protection programs or effective training. Flexibility and weak social protection com-
bined to produce the "worst of both worlds," according to the International Labor 
Organization (ILO).25 
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The problem is more complex than providing "mobility with a safety net." In-
deed, multilateral financial institutions have long called for enhanced levels of protec-
tion to accompany the more flexible labor markets they have promoted.26 The failure 
in the region has been an inability to approach the problem by creating employment 
regimes based on coherence in labor relations, welfare policies, and labor law and 
that involve participation by trade unions. In one study, social protection levels were 
higher and more effective in those countries in which unions have been able to par-
ticipate in the design and implementation of programs. Likewise, levels have been 
higher where state involvement in devising relevant and coordinated institutions has 
been strong. In this case, Brazil and South Korea ranked more highly in terms of 
quality of social protection than-did either Argentina or Chile, even though Chile is 
often presented as a model of such reform in the region.27 
Legal reforms have also affected collective rights. Some reforms have specifically 
aimed to reduce collective protections, such as reforms that decentralize collective 
bargaining, or those that constrain the right to strike. In the latter case, constraints 
range from laws requiring government authorization of strikes, to the allowing of 
striker replacements, to expanded definitions of what sectors are included among "es-
sential services" whose workers may not strike. In most cases these changes have been 
implemented by executive decree under conditions certified by the president to be of 
"necessity and urgency." In some countries, such as Argentina, there was widespread 
sentiment that this executive privilege had been abused. Other reforms affecting col-
lective rights include laws that allow new collective agreements to contain lower stan-
dards than in previous contracts. These changes were passed in Brazil and Venezuela, 
and with restrictions in Argentina. 
Rather than appear as the target of legal changes, collective rights have argu-
ably been eroded more by individual employment reforms and by the lack of ac-
tion to strengthen collective rights protections, either via reform of existing laws 
or through new laws that expand rights. For example, the inctease in workers em-
ployed on temporary contracts has lowered union membership rolls and further 
weakened union influence in the workplace. New workers hired in this way are 
difficult to organize, given their temporary status. The expansion of probationary 
periods has a similar effect, since employers have an incentive to dismiss workers 
before they become entitled to an indefinite contract, with the higher severance 
payments these imply. 
Most governments in the region have focused their efforts on lowering employer 
costs and generating gteater flexibility in hiring and firing for employers than they 
have in implementing parallel policies to guarantee protected mobility for individuals 
or in sttengthening collective rights. The latter could free labor organizations to play 
greater roles in addressing labor market and employment problems. This refusal to 
expand labor rights may be due to several factors. One is mistrust between govern-
ments and ttade unions that, while historic, has also been reinforced by economic 
reforms that weaken and marginalize unions. Employer resistance coupled with the 
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international financial institutions' (IFI) general inability to contemplate unions as 
part of the solution have also contributed to this climate of mistrust. 
A more fundamental issue is that of union power. Most governments and em-
ployers would prefer to have weaker unions than strong ones, because they would 
prefer to implement policies and run businesses with as little possible resistance and 
compromise. Even though the industrial working class has historically been weak in 
Latin America, unions have exercised disproportionate political power via their con-
centration in export industries and urban centers and with their political alliances. 
Recent economic trends and market-oriented reforms have helped to weaken unions' 
economic clout, although in some countries the political alliances remain significant, 
especially during elections. Indeed, where labor-political alliances remain a factor, 
compromise on labor reforms tends to be higher, often countering IFI and employer 
demands.28 Nonetheless, in a regional context in which union density has declined 
and unions have lost influence, government authorities seem intent on hastening this 
trend rather than reversing it. 
This perspective explains the absence of proactive collective rights protections in 
the region during the recent market reform period. Despite a recent labor reform that 
offered some improvements, Chile's labor laws continue to exclude technological im-
provements from among the subjects of collective bargaining and continue to make 
multi-employer bargaining difficult in practice.29 Chile is also one of the few Latin 
American countries to permit striker replacements. Collective bargaining coverage is 
also limited in several countries (e.g., Peru and Chile). The right to bargain remains 
restricted for a variety of sectors, including domestic and agricultural workers and 
public administration, as does the right to strike, either through "essential services" 
exemptions or lack of government authorization. 
The right to organize and freedom of association also face constraints. In Mexico tri-
partite labor boards and collusion among "official" unions, employers, and government 
continue to restrict independent unions from organizing and gaining tide to the collec-
tive agreement. In the maquiladora sector in particular, blacklists and dismissals of union 
activists continue to make organizing difficult. Given the expansion of this sector as a 
proportion of overall Mexican industrial employment, these constraints are of special con-
cern. Indeed, restrictions on organizing and bargaining predominate in free trade zones 
throughout the region.30 In Peru workers encounter obstacles to forming unions due to 
laws passed under President Fujimori. In Argentina labor organizations that oppose the 
Peronist-linked Confederation General de Trabajadores (CGT) have trouble gaining^m<?«-
eria gremialy a government designation that would allow dissident unions to command 
resources to benefit their organizations and their members. 
Unions in some countries face even more fundamental challenges. In Venezuela 
the government of Hugo Chavez tried to restructure labor organizations, labeling 
them part of the corrupt ancien regime. In Colombia trade union leaders ate targets 
of guerrilla and paramilitary attacks in the ongoing civil war. Indeed, as political in-
stability grows in the region, trade unions come under increasing threat. 
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The most recent labor reform efforts by governments in the region have done little 
to remedy these gaps in rights protection. The Mexican congress will soon consider 
a labor reform that does nothing to protect the organizing and bargaining tights of 
unions but instead establishes greater flexibility for employers while reinforcing cor-
poratist union privileges.31 The Chilean government of Ricardo Lagos passed a series 
of small improvements to legislation that largely dates from the Pinochet era. Even 
these changes, however, did not address the core constraints on bargaining and strikes 
dating from the dictatorship.32 President Fernando de la Riia in Argentina tried to 
reverse earlier labor protections negotiated between then-president Carlos Saul Me-
nem and the C G T in 1998, which led to general strikes and a senate scandal involv-
ing bribes in exchange for voting for the labor reform. This led the vice-president to 
resign in protest and eventually contributed to the fall of the president in December 
2001. In Brazil union fotmation and bargaining laws have remained untouched, 
although plans to revise these have existed for years. Unions in Brazil have argued 
that such reforms should only take place in the context of guarantees for unions that 
might otherwise be weakened by reform. Meanwhile, intense union competition and 
employer whipsawing create precarious conditions for trade unions. 
As rights are eroded in the formal sector, the proportion of individuals who lack 
legal protections has grown. Of special concern is the role of women, whose in-
creased labor force participation has not been matched by access to protection. De-
spite strengthened gender discrimination laws in many countries, enforcement has 
been weak. In the maquiladora sector, for instance, strong maternity rights provisions 
have led employers to avoid hiring pregnant women and to1) discoutage pregnancy 
during employment. Other proposed solutions to the problem of female employ-
ment have also fallen short. Special temporary contracts for women have not solved 
the problem of legal protection, since they usually entail limited benefits. The more 
common approach to this problem has been to propose greater labor market flexibil-
ity so as to expand possibilities for formal sector employment to women, youth, and 
other excluded sectors. Unfortunately, this has frequently taken the form of lowering 
protections and security for all workers without generating additional employment. 
T h e definition of the problem and the nature of the solutions have turned worker 
organizations into enemies of these reforms. Unions have fought most individual and 
collective reforms aimed at flexibilizing the market or lowering protections. Although 
unions have rarely been successful at blocking reforms, they have often secured com-
promises. Typically these compromises have involved accepting concessions that 
lower protection for individual employment in exchange for defense of existing pro-
visions on collective rights, or for participation in the way individual reforms are 
implemented in workplaces. Unions typically defended those legal provisions that 
would ensure organizational survival.33 In this way, unions were often forced to adopt 
defensive postures that fed critics' claims of unions' narrow interests. They were rarely 
brought into the process to discuss labor market problems via consultation mecha-
nisms, even though several countries had used such mechanisms in the past. In those 
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cases where governments did set up tripartite for labor law discussions, these often 
took place in settings that were unfavorable for unions. 
Few people would argue that reform of the region's labor laws is unnecessary. 
However, the goals of many of the reforms and the ways in which these are carried 
out pose a problem for labor organizations. Most reforms in the region are aimed at 
overcoming union resistance to labor market policies by further weakening unions. 
Moreover, the focus is on "flexible" labor markets, often to the detriment of coor-
dinated labor market institutions. These approaches limit prospects for policies that 
both ensure individuals' "secure mobility" through the labor market and that protect 
collective rights. 
The Cost of Weak Unions 
Two contradictory trends have emerged. On the one hand, the world community has 
conceded a greater role to the ILO in overseeing labor rights compliance in member 
nations, trade agreements have increasingly adopted labor standards provisions, and 
general agreement on basic labor rights has emerged. On the other hand, market 
reforms and labor law and policy changes in Latin America have produced what we 
might call a "labor rights deficit" in the region. As a consensus emerges in interna-
tional debates on the global economy about the importance of international labot 
standards and rights, the downward pressure on national laws persists. As national 
reforms continue to weaken unions, the danger is that unions' ability to leverage 
international standards in national politics will disappear. 
For international standards and rights to have teeth, reasonably strong labor advo-
cates must exist within countries. Unions have traditionally played this role in Latin 
America, having filed most of the region's complaints to the ILO.34 The weakening 
of unions has a cost in terms of protection for labor rights on the ground and for the 
credibility of an international commitment to labor rights. Yet it is not enough for 
unions to be willing or able to pursue complaints thtough international channels. 
They must also be able to wage national and even international campaigns to exert 
pressure on governments and legislatures. In short, they must be able to wield power 
at the national level. 
This brings us to another cost of weak unions: a "democracy deficit." Although 
unions have been criticized for being "insiders" whose insistence on preserving their 
gains produces costs for the rest of society, they have played an important role in sup-
porting democracy, improving working conditions, and defending broader citizens' 
rights. As unions' size and political power become increasingly limited, it is not diffi-
cult to imagine that this might have an impact on the quality of democracy and even 
on support for democracy in the region. 
The weakening of unions affects democracy in several ways. Increased job inse-
curity, declining union density, and constraints on bargaining, strikes, and union 
formation limit workers' voice at the workplace. Union voice has become increasingly 
marginalized in national policy as governments have pursued anti-labor policies and 
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social concertation (tripartite consultation) mechanisms have been abandoned or be-
come ineffective. The passage of laws that effectively weaken unions has also affected 
democratic institutions, such as legislatures. In several countries, presidents resorted 
to decrees to implement reforms, bypassing legislative debate. The International 
Monetary Fund's strong pressure on governments to pass reforms has also distorted 
democratic processes, as some governments have in turn pressured congressional rep-
resentatives to vote in favor of reforms even to the extent of resorting to illegal mea-
sures, as in Argentina. These developments are another exptession of the recognized 
tension between economic reform and democracy in developing countries.35 
Some observers of the tegion's politics have argued that as unions have declined, 
other groups have emerged to fill the void in representing society.36 These groups in-
clude informal sectot workers, social movements in urban neighborhoods and among 
peasants and indigenous groups, and even nongovernmental organizations. However, 
while these groups may command attention during certain key political moments, 
labot organizations remain among the most stable, organized, and consolidated 
representative organizations in society. Most are reasonably democratic, many have 
longstanding ties with political parties, and many are recognized and experienced 
interlocutors with employets and the state. Labor organizations are adept at operat-
ing in the arena of institutional politics. Although this has often been used against 
them—critics may argue that unions are "too much" linked with traditional parties 
and a corrupt or inert bureaucracy—institutionalism is also an important feature of 
stable democracies.37 
Recent political developments in the tegion illustrate unions' continued relevance 
despite the widespread ttend of union weakening. Unions have often served as the 
proverbial canary in the mine, warning against economic hardship and social injus-
tice. Unions' resistance to elites' economic and social policies is not necessarily a sign 
of obstinate refusal to change, but rather an indicator that such changes—or the pro-
cesses by which they are reached—are seen as unjust, giving'vcsice to the sentiments 
of a majority of the population, most of whom are not organizedj 
Labor unions were recently at the forefront of major political disputes in Venezu-
ela,38 Argentina, Ecuador, and Bolivia that dealt with threats to democracy and popu-
lar rejection of market reforms. In Brazil a former trade union leader who advocates 
expanded social policies and limits to neoliberalism attained the presidency with the 
support of the unions. Similarly, countries with weak unions have been less success-
ful at conftonting threats to democracy: Peru under Fujimori, Colombia, and most 
Central American nations. These cases underscore the importance of strong unions 
for safeguarding democratic processes in the tegion. 
Conclusion 
In this papet I have argued that economic, institutional, and legal reforms in Latin 
America have undermined organized labor's ability to play critical roles in contempo-
rary society. These roles include supporting democratic government, improving the 
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quality of democracy by providing a voice for poor citizens, and advocating for labor 
rights protections. The need for strong workers' organizations is as evident today as it 
was at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
The instability generated by market reforms and widespread popular rejection 
of neoliberal policies have produced a volatile political situation in the region that 
contrasts sharply with sunny predictions of stable democracy and economic growth 
in the 1990s. 
Political leaders are vulnerable in Venezuela and Peru, and popular revolts threw out 
presidents in Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador. Contrary to earlier claims that the entire 
region had converged around liberal capitalism, the leaderships of Venezuela, Ecuador, 
Argentina, and Brazil today broadly reject the policies of the "Washington Consensus." 
Colombia remains mired in conflict generated by guerrilla war, paramilitary armies, and 
drug mafias. Even Mexico and Chile, stable regimes by comparison, have made limited 
advances in social reform and expanded democracy despite the promise of their new lead-
erships. Mercosur (the "Common Market of the South") is at a standstill.35 Economic 
growth in the region has been stagnant. The American war and occupation in Iraq will 
produce more negative economic effects in Latin America as the effects of recession in 
the North and oil price increases hit the region. In this context, strong workers' organiza-
tions remain more, not less, important for advancing social justice, providing a voice of 
conscience, and stabilizing democracy in the region. 
The fate of Latin American trade unions also affects the U.S. labor movement. 
Clearly, weaker unions in Latin America lead to lower labor costs for companies 
operating in the region and greater flexibility for employers to dictate working condi-
tions. This situation only accelerates current low-wage trends in some of the poor-
est countries, particularly in Central America and the Caribbean and in free trade 
zones throughout the region. U.S. unions will have an even harder struggle to stem 
the exodus of jobs to developing countries and to fight against exploitative working 
conditions abroad. 
Weakened unions would also affect the U.S. labor movement through the loss 
of strong allies to advocate for improved labor rights in the global economy and for 
changes in the global agenda, particularly through hemispheric agreements such as 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). The importance of this issue is evident 
from the example of Brazil, where the labor movement there stands to influence the 
terms of FTAA negotiations through its relationship with the new president. Strong 
labor advocates in other countries, and a strong relationship with those advocates, can 
only help the U.S. labor movement as it pursues its interests in a changing world. 
Notes 
1. See Nelson, 1994; Cortazar, Lustig, and Sabot, 1998; and Williams, 2001. For a review of 
some of this literature, see Geddes, 1995. For an exception in the treatment of unions, see 
Murillo, 2001. 
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2. Collier and Collier, 1991; Reuschmeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, 1992; Collier and Ma-
honey, 1997. 
3. Bronstein, 1995, 1997. 
4. Despite the progressive nature of much labor legislation, there are constraints on the 
fulfillment of the law due to problems of enforcement ot political discrimination, such 
as when opposition or nonaffiliated unions attempt to avail themselves of legal protec-
tions. Employers find loopholes in the law or through the courts in order to avoid some 
of the costs imposed by the legislation. At the same time, an ever-smaller proportion of 
the workforce is covered by labor legislation since employment has increasingly expanded 
in the informal sector. These factots limit the effectiveness and protective reach of labor 
legislation in the region. 
5. Cordova, 1989. 
6. Bronstein, 1995, Cook, 1998. 
7. Even where unions were weak democratic transitions still brought pressures for labor 
rights expansion in labor codes. Stronger individual employment protections and collec-
tive rights were incorporated into the new labor codes and Constitution of Paraguay in the 
early 1990s despite the weakness of the labor movement. In Guatemala and El Salvador 
pressure from the International Labor Organization and the United States (through the 
Generalized System of Preferences) compensated for the weakness of labor movements in 
those countries (Frundt, 1998). 
8. Valenzuela, 1989. 
9. Cox Edwards, 1997, 135. 
10. McGuire, 1997. 
11. Williamson, 1994. 
12. The rate of urban unemployment in Latin American countries as a whole ranged from 
5.5 percent to 6.5 percent between 1990 and 1994. By the encTof.the decade it reached 
levels close to 8.4 percent, and 9.4 percent at the beginning of 2002 (ILO, 2002:10). For 
another "gloomy" overview of unemployment in the 1990s, see Duryea et al., 2003. 
13. Duryea et al., 2003. 
14. Guimaraes and Comin, 2000. 
15. ILO, 1999. 
IS. ILO, 2002:12. 
17. Trade union membership fell by between 1 and 29 percent during the 1990s, depending 
on the country (ILO, 2002: 27). 
18. Loraand Pages, 1997; Edwards, 1995. 
19. Marquez and Pages, 1998; Inter-American Development Bank, 1998. 
250 
Unions, Markets, and Democracy in Latin America 
20. For arguments in favor of labor market flexibility and for recommended reforms and poli-
cies, see Cortizat, Lustig, and Sabot, 1998:195; Birdsall, Graham, and Sabot, 1998:5; Cox 
Edwards, 1997:130; Edwards and Lusrig, 1997:20; Lora and Pages, 1997; Marquez and 
Pages, 1998; and Inter-American Development Bank, 1998. 
21. Edwards and Lustig, 1997:20-21; Birdsall, Graham, and Sabot, 1998. 
22. For a succinct account that conttasts the values and concerns of neoliberal labor econom-
ics and indusrrial relations, see Adams, 1995. 
23. Nelson, 1994. 
24. In the Brazilian case, however, other institutional incentives greatly raise turnover levels 
and therefore provide high levels of labor market flexibility while reducing employer in-
centives to invest in training (Amadeo, et al., 1995; Carmargo, 1997). 
25. Haagh and Cook, 2003; ILO, 2002. 
26. IADB, 1998;WorldBank, 1995. 
27. Haagh and Cook, 2003. 
28. Cook, 2002. 
29. Frank, 2002; Haagh and Cook, 2003. 
30. Frundt, 1998. 
31. La Botz and Alexander, 2003; Cook, 2003. 
32. Haagh, 2001; Frank, 2002. 
33. This strategy was adopted by "stronger" national labor movements that possessed orga-
nizational resources protected by law, such as union financing mechanisms or a role in 
social welfare schemes: the cases of Brazil, Argentina, and perhaps Mexico. The context 
also favored established or "traditional" labor organizations ovet their challengers: the 
CGT over the CTA in Argentina and the CTM over the UNT in Mexico. Where labor 
had neither strong collective tights nor corporatist privileges (e.g., the cases of Chile and 
Peru), resistance to labor law reforms that further weakened organizational strength was 
more difficult. 
34. ILO, 2002. 
35. Haggard and Kaufman, 1995. 
36. Roberts, 2002; Roever, Colliet, and Seawright, 2003. 
37. The most promising scenario for advancing the interests of workers and the poor—and 
for democracy—is not the substitution of labor unions by NGOs or social movements 
but tathet the building of alliances between these groups. A positive example would be 
the Hemispheric Social Alliance, composed of unions, NGOs, and other groups across the 
Americas, that has formed to counter the governments' agenda in the FTAA. 
38. The Venezuelan case provides the clearest example of the institutional role of labor. Hugo 
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Chavez attacked the unions for being institutions linked to traditional political parties and 
the old system. These attacks place the CTV on the side of employers, the church, and 
traditional parties in that country's conflict. 
39. Mercosur, or Mercado Comun del Sur, is a free trade area formed in 1991 comprising 
of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay with associate members Chile, Bolivia, and 
Peru. 
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